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           NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3234 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TYRON ELLERBE, 
    Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 2-12-cr-00168-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin  
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on October 6, 2015 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed October 29, 2015) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________
                                              
 *This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent.  
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Tyron Ellerbe pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon and two counts of making false statements to a federal firearms licensee 
and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(1)(A).  The 
District Court sentenced Ellerbe to seventy months’ imprisonment and thirty-six months’ 
supervised release, which Ellerbe timely appealed.  Ellerbe’s counsel has moved to 
withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that Ellerbe’s appeal 
contains no nonfrivolous issues.  Ellerbe filed a pro se brief challenging his sentence 
based on the failure of the Bureau of Prisons to credit him for the time he served awaiting 
trial and because of representations made about the impact of his federal conviction on 
his then pending violation.  We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the 
order of the District Court.1   
 Our Court conducts a two-step inquiry when deciding whether to grant an Anders 
motion.  United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  First, we consider 
whether counsel has adequately fulfilled the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 
109.2(a) by (1) “satisfy[ing] the [C]ourt that counsel has thoroughly examined the record 
in search of appealable issues” and (2) “explain[ing] why the issues are frivolous.”  Id.  
Second, we consider “whether an independent review of the record presents any 
nonfrivolous issues.”  Id. (citing United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 
                                              
 
1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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2000)).  While we generally exercise plenary review, Simon v. Gov’t of V.I., 679 F.3d 
109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012), Ellerbe’s unconditional guilty plea limits our review to three 
issues: (1) the jurisdiction of the District Court; (2) the validity of the defendant’s plea; 
and (3) the legality of his sentence, see United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). 
 Here, counsel has discharged his duty under Anders to scour the record and 
explain why no issues for appeal are nonfrivolous.  Counsel’s brief sufficiently explains 
that (1) Ellerbe’s guilty plea was valid, and (2) the imposed terms of imprisonment and 
supervised release were proper.  We discuss each in turn.  
 First, Ellerbe’s “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent” guilty plea was valid.  See 
United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  To establish a valid plea, a 
court must “address the defendant personally in open court [and] . . . inform the 
defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands” his various rights; 
“determine that the plea is voluntary”; and “determine that there is a factual basis for the 
plea.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)-(3).  The record shows that the District Court’s plea 
colloquy was comprehensive and complied with Rule 11.  While there was some 
discussion during the plea colloquy of whether Ellerbe could appeal the District Court’s 
denial of his motion to suppress, the District Court made clear that Ellerbe would not be 
able to challenge the denial of his motion if he entered a guilty plea, and Ellerbe twice 
acknowledged that he understood.  As we can discern no plausible argument that 
Ellerbe’s plea was not “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,” Tidwell, 521 F.3d at 251, an 
appeal challenging the validity of the guilty plea would be frivolous. 
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 Second, the imposed terms of imprisonment and supervised release were proper.  
Violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(1)(A) carry a ten- and five-year statutory 
maximum sentence, respectively.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)-(2).  The District Court 
considered the advisory range of 63-78 months under the Sentencing Guidelines, and, 
after diligently considering the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see 
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc), imposed a sentence 
near the middle of that range.  As for supervised release, while the District Court could 
have imposed a term of up to twelve years, see 18 § U.S.C. 3583(b)(2), it limited 
Ellerbe’s supervised release to thirty-six months.  Thus, the District Court’s imposition of 
seventy months’ imprisonment and thirty-six months’ supervised release fell within the 
applicable statutory and advisory ranges, and Ellerbe’s challenge to the term of 
imprisonment stemming from the BOP’s failure to credit him for time served is 
frivolous.2     
                                              
 2 Insofar as Ellerbe is arguing that the District Court’s judgment stating that the 
“defendant shall receive credit for all time served in custody for this offense,” App. A3, 
compels the BOP to credit Ellerbe for the time, such an argument is properly raised 
through administrative remedies or a writ of habeas corpus.  See United States v. Wilson, 
503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) (holding that the Attorney General has the exclusive authority 
to compute credit for time served under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)); Barden v. Keohane, 921 
F.2d 476, 479 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that “issues that affect a prisoner’s term are 
fundamental issues of liberty” falling within our § 2241 jurisdiction).   
 Ellerbe’s assertion about representations made concerning the impact of his 
federal conviction on his then pending probation violation also does not present a 
nonfrivolous claim as the sentence imposed was reasonable and lawful.  Moreover, even 
if the District Court was informed that the parole authorities were not going to punish 
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 Turning now to our independent review of the record, we discern no nonfrivolous 
issue left unaddressed by counsel that could arguably support an appeal.  See Youla, 241 
F.3d at 300.  Indeed, of the issues to which our review is limited as a result of Ellerbe’s 
unconditional plea, the only one not addressed by counsel is the District Court’s 
jurisdiction, which was assured by the fact that this case involved four counts of federal 
criminal offenses.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  Ellerbe’s arguments in his pro se brief do not 
raise any additional nonfrivolous issues.  Thus, any appeal challenging the District 
Court’s jurisdiction also would be frivolous. 
* * * 
 In sum, counsel’s Anders brief adequately analyzes the only issues that could have 
been mounted on appeal, and we therefore will grant counsel’s Anders motion and affirm 
the order of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                  
him for his conduct, it could have used this information to decide to increase his federal 
sentence.   
